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NOTES & COMMENTS
HERE'S WHY HOLLYWOOD SHOULD KISS THE
HANDSHAKE DEAL GOODBYE
I. THE SET UP
"Movie makers do lunch, not contracts."' This is how Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit summarized Hollywood's use of oral
agreements. 2 Although such "handshake" deals are by no means new to the
film business, 3 Judge Kozinski's comments evidence an increasing distaste
for their use in the industry.4 Indeed, the tide seems to be rising against
handshake deals in Hollywood, for good reason. Although oral contracts
are thought to provide flexibility for a fast-paced and dynamic industry, the
reality is that their lack of clear and defined contractual terms often leaves
parties making up the rules as they go along.
Part II of this Comment examines the history of legal controversy
surrounding the movie industry's reliance upon handshake deals. Part III
demonstrates the disparity of bargaining power between Hollywood artists 5
and their employers, and examines the manner in which oral contracts are
used to exploit this disparity. Part IV identifies the essential functions of
formal, written agreements and the advantages they offer the movie
business. Part V refutes the usual excuses for the industry's use of oral
contracts, and further identifies a judicial distaste for Hollywood's
handshake deals. To conclude, Part VI examines the existing precedent for
legislating against the handshake deal, the policy reasons for doing so, and
the concrete steps the California legislature should take to "cure"
1. Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1103 (1991).
2. See id.
3. Gary M. McLaughlin, Note, Oral Contracts in the EntertainmentIndustry, 1 VA. SPORTS
&ENT. L.J. 101,102 (2001).
4. See infra Part V.C.
5. The term "Hollywood" as used in this Comment shall refer to the motion picture industry.
Hereinafter, the terms "actors," "directors," and "writers" shall be collectively referred to as
"artists."
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Hollywood of its addiction to oral agreements. As will become apparent
from the history and consequences of handshake deals, particularly with
respect to artists, the effects of handshake deals are such that the film
business should do away with them altogether.
II. HISTORY OF THE WORLD, PART I: THE CASELAW ON
HANDSHAKE DEALS

The handshake deal is by no means "fresh off the bus" as they say in
the business. Hollywood's reliance upon oral contracts and the controversy
surrounding them goes back almost as long as films have been made in
Hollywood.6 The first major case on the subject was Columbia Pictures
Corp. v. De Toth,7 decided in the 1940s. In De Toth, Andre de Toth
entered into a seven-year oral contract to direct films for Columbia
Pictures. 8 The defendant then gained a measure of "notoriety" from several
movies he directed under the deal. 9 When he left to pursue a more
lucrative contract with another studio before his deal with Columbia
expired, Columbia sued him to enforce the handshake agreement. 10 The
defendant argued successfully that the contract did not fall within the
statute of frauds1 because it was structured as a one-year deal with six
the oral
consecutive one-year options. 12 However, the court still held that
13
agreement was binding, and ordered De Toth to honor its terms.
In still another case from the forties, Johnston v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp.,14 the studio entered into an oral agreement to buy the
rights to the plaintiffs book.' 5 After this handshake deal was made, the
studio presented an additional written contract asking Johnston to waive
certain rights, a provision to which he had not previously agreed.' 6 When
Johnston refused to agree to the waiver, Fox claimed it had no agreement to

6. Jay M. Spillane, Lawsuits over "HandshakeDeals" Are as Old as the Entertainment
Industry (andCan Be Easily Avoided), 11 THE ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 15, 15 (1993).

7. 197 P.2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
8. Spillane, supra note 6, at 15.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part VI.B.

12. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth, 197 P.2d 580, 587-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
13. Spillane, supra note 6, at 15; see also De Toth, 197 P.2d at 586.

14. 187 P.2d 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
15. Id.at 477.
16. Id.at 479.
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purchase the book rights. 17 The jury disagreed, finding the existence of an
8
oral contract, and awarded damages to Johnston.'
Perhaps the most infamous case involving a Hollywood handshake
deal is the unpublished case Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger.19 In
Basinger, actress Kim Basinger orally agreed several times to star in the
film Boxing Helena.20 For reasons that are subject to dispute,2 ' Basinger
eventually refused to perform in the film. 22 When the producers sued her

for breach of contract, the jury found that there was indeed a handshake
deal, and awarded the producers damages of $8.92 million.23 Although the
decision was reversed on a technicality and then settled before it was
retried, 4 some commentators thought the case might be the "death knell"
for the handshake deal in Hollywood.25
In another modern case, Warner Brothers sued Francis Ford Coppola
over ownership of his Pinocchio film project, claiming that Coppola
breached a contract for his services.2 6 Coppola and the studio had entered
into negotiations regarding the film, but did not sign any written, long-form
documents.27 When Coppola entered discussions with another studio to
produce the film, Warner Brothers threatened to commence litigation,
claiming it had a handshake deal with Coppola. 28 Fearing litigation, the
other studio dropped out of the picture, and Coppola lost a lucrative
contract. 29 Coppola sued Warner Brothers, claiming tortious interference,
and "[t]he jury found against Warner Brothers and awarded Coppola $80

17. Id. at 479-80.
18. Id. at 489.

19. Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1994); see also Michael T. Giordano, Comment, Boxing Basinger: Oral Contracts and
the Manager's Privilege on the Ropes in Hollywood, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 289 (2002).

20. Giordano, supra note 19, at 288.
21. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Kim Basinger's purported reasons for withdrawing from
the film Boxing Helena).

22. See Giordano, supra note 19, at 288-89.
23. See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 102.
24. David Ainbender, Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Kim Basinger, et al., Suit Talk Case
Closet,
HOLLYWOOD
LAW
CYBERCENTER
(Jan.
1996),
at

http://www.hollywoodnet.com/Law/suittalk/closet0196.html.
25. Spillane, supra note 6, at 15.
26. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 110; see also Coppola v. Warner Bros., No. B154280,
2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1782 (Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2003).
27. See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 125.
28. See id.
at 124.
29. Id.
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million, including $60 million in punitive damages. 3 °
These cases demonstrate that Hollywood's reliance on oral
agreements is long-established and that it has generated a good deal of
controversy over the years. But despite the controversy evidenced by these
cases, the handshake deal has persisted. 31 By looking at the reasons
proffered for continuing this reliance, it will become clear that the
arguments are fairly weak. First, however, it is important to put
Hollywood's reliance on handshake deals into context by identifying the
essential disparity in bargaining power from which the studios benefit.
III. THE UNTOUCHABLES: BARGAINING POWER DISPARITY BETWEEN
ARTISTS AND THOSE WHO HIRE THEM

To understand the problem with Hollywood's handshake deals, it is
first necessary to reveal the unequal bargaining power that artists possess
with respect to their employers, the studios, and producers. This inequality
is due to a factor commonly found in employment situations-a disparity in
sheer numbers between artists and those who hire them that effectively saps
artists of their bargaining power. 32 To see how this works, it is important to
look at the numbers.
A. Murder by Numbers
There can be no doubt that there is a wide gap in numbers between
the few studios on the one hand, and the multitude of artists on the other.
To witness, there are roughly ten major film companies that control almost
the entire business of film production and distribution.33 Of the roughly
500 films distributed every year, major studios distribute less than half of
them, but earn more than ninety-five percent of the box office revenue.34
By contrast, there are at all times a multitude of actors available.35 The
Screen Actors Guild, the actors' union that admits only a fraction of those

30. Id. at 110.
31. Id. at 102-03.
32. See infra Part III.A (discussing bargaining power disparity).
33. Cinema Screen, Distributors and Production Companies, CinemaScreen.Com.UK, at
http://www.cinemascreen.co.uk/directory/default.asp?c=6.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
34. MARK LiTWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY 2 (2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter LITWAK, DEALMAKING].
35. Dave McNary, SAG, AFTRA Agree to Maybe Agree, VARIETY.COM (Nov. 15, 2002), at
http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout-story&articleid=VR 117876142&categoryid
=1066&cs=1 .html.
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seeking employment, boasts approximately 98,000 members.36 With a
ratio likely even greater than 9,800 to 1,3 7 there can therefore be no doubt
that artists exponentially outnumber their prospective employers in
Hollywood.
Such a disparity in numbers effectively works to sap employees of
their bargaining power, a result that is evidenced both by caselaw and
legislation. For instance, California courts have found that an employee
generally has unequal bargaining power with respect to her employer, and
that the employer usually dictates the terms of employment. 38 For similar
reasons, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), in
part based on its finding of a general "inequality of bargaining power
between employees.., and employers.,, 39 Typically, this condition exists
because "employer[s] ... use competition among workingmen to drive
down wage rates and enforce substandard conditions of employment. ' 4°
Where employees have diminished bargaining power due to a lack of
alternative employment, and therefore cannot negotiate for more favorable
terms, an employer may use its position to impose unfavorable terms on the
employee. 4'
These same competitive employment conditions are standard in the
film industry. For the average "union" actor, the prospect of supporting
one's self with the craft is grim-seventy percent of all SAG members earn
less than $7,500 per year from acting.42 Even famous actors are not
immune from these conditions-the fact that even stars have to compete
ferociously for roles bears this proposition out.43 When people say the
business is "tough," they are likely referring to the fact that artists are
plenty, jobs are scarce, and even successful artists must compete
aggressively for work. Although neither the text of the NLRA nor existing
caselaw mentions the acting profession specifically, the dog-eat-dog world
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Janzen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 263 (Ct. App. 1997).
39. Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 215 (Ct. App. 2002).
40. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 723 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
41. Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 1996).
42. Dave McNary,
SAG's Bitter Pill, VARIETY.COM
(Nov. 6, 2002), at
http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout-story&articleid=VRI I117875637&categoryid= 1066&q
uery=sag%27s+and+bitter+and+pill&display=SAG%27s+bitter+pill&cs=1 .html
[hereinafter
McNary, Bitter Pill].
43. See Steve Weinstein, Amy Madigan: A Voice for Tough Choices, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1989, Part V (Calendar), at I (remarking that "[s]cores of accomplished, mature actresses
compete for the tiny handful of star roles").
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of professional acting clearly exemplifies the dangers of bargaining power
disparity.
Although it is established that an employer, in this case a Hollywood
studio, will in most instances maintain an advantage in dictating the terms
of an agreement, what remains to be seen is whether the studios have used
this tactical advantage to impose unfavorable conditions on their
employees, namely the artists. "Handshake deals," which are typically
thrust upon the artist, generally favor the studio over the artist. 44 These oral
agreements are unfair in two ways: they allow the studios a "way out" that
the artist does not have, and when they are broken, they impact the artist
much harder than they do the studio.45 An examination of each of these
points will reveal how employers are the ones that benefit from handshake
deals in Hollywood.
First, handshake deals "allow studios to gain an unfair advantage
because so little is spelled out."'46 In other words, even though such an

agreement binds the artist, there is no guarantee by the studio that the film
will actually be made, or even what the parameters of the movie will be.47
This leaves the studio with a "way out" of a handshake deal that the artist
48
clearly does not have: the studio can decide not to produce the film.
Because there are any number of reasons why a film might not be
produced, including lack of funding, withdrawal of talent, and problems
with a script, the studio is equipped with an arsenal of excuses. 49 Because
the artist is bound, but the studio has a "way out," such a deal clearly favors
the studio.
In addition, handshake deals favor the studio because the effect of a
broken agreement is far worse for the actor than for a studio or production
company. "[O]ne cannot deny that actors are at both a professional and a
financial disadvantage [with respect to the studios] when a relationship
based on an oral agreement goes sour. '' 50 Studios and producers have the
financial incentive to remain uncommitted until all of the talent has
committed, 5 1 and view paying a particular artist off as a minimal cost in the

44. See Giordano, supra note 19, at 299-301 (discussing the problems created by oral
contracts).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 299.
47. See id. at 300.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Giordano, supra note 19, at 300.
51. See infra Part V (discussing "precontractual reliance").
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event that they cancel a production.5 2 The artist, however, is out of a
paycheck if the deal is scuttled, and may even have to pay damages.5 3
Perhaps that is why the cases suggest that studios prefer handshake
deals. In both Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger54 and Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. De Toth,5 5 the courts found the existence of an oral
contract to the studio's benefit. 56 In Coppola v. Warner Bros.,57 the court
found the absence of an oral contract, which was to the studio's
detriment. 58 Although the court found the existence of an oral contract to
the artist's benefit in Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,59 it
did so based on the existence of a collateral agreement that the studio
presented to the artist after they made the handshake deal.6 ° In other
words, the studio in Johnston was happy to bank on the existence of an oral
agreement until the artist refused to waive additional rights. 6 1 As these
cases suggest, oral contracts appear to be equated with the studio's interest
and not with the artist's.
But do the studios impose handshake deals on artists? Given that they
are so favorable to studios, the fact that oral contracts are prevalent in
Hollywood suggests that they are indeed forced upon artists. There is no
question that handshake deals are widely used. Charlton Heston famously
boasted that he never signed a completed contract before beginning
production on any of his more than sixty films. 62 Even in modem times
"[a]n agent may commit his client to a project, and the
written contract may
63
not be signed until the project has been completed.,
When viewed in light of the highly competitive market for acting
jobs, however, it should come as no surprise that even Charlton Heston
would agree to work his entire career without a written agreement. 64 In

52. See ART LINsON, A POUND OF FLESH: PERILOUS TALES OF HOW TO PRODUCE MOVIES
IN HOLLYWOOD 92 (1993).

53. See supra Part lI.
54. No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994).
55. 197 P.2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
56. See supra Part I.
57. No. B154280, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1782 (Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2003).
58. See supra Part II.
59. 187 P.2d 474 (Cal. Ct.App. 1947).
60. Id. at 488-89.
61. See id. at 479.
62. Charlton Heston, Of Trust, Manners and How Hollywood Works, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1993, at F5.
63. LITwAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 251.
64. See Heston, supra note 62.
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Hollywood, "[i]f you argue, you get a reputation for being obstreperous,
and you will be replaced ....

Because oral agreements are "so

commonplace in Hollywood that few players ever even consider walking
out on one, 66 an actor who refused to work under an oral agreement might
well be unable to find a job. In such an environment it is plain to see why
artists are willing to work with only a handshake deal: they have no choice.
B. A Star Is Born
The disparity in bargaining power, although more prevalent among
unknown actors, still exists for those actors who have achieved "star"
status. As proof of the numerical differential, one need only look at the
sheer number of so-called "movie stars" on the market. Kim Basinger, for
example, is only thirty-seventh on the list of female actors when ranked by
total box office sales.67 She drops to fifty-eighth on the list of female
actors in a starring role when ranked by average box office gross sales, and
68
to fifty-ninth on the list when narrowed to movies released in the 1990s,

the period during which Boxing Helena was produced. While Basinger's
box office rankings by no means prove the availability of comparable
actors to the producers of Boxing Helena, they cast doubt upon the utter
exclusivity of her services.
Although the presence of a superstar in any motion picture may
increase the chance of the movie's success, this name recognition alone
does not necessarily level the bargaining power disparity. The argument
against the proposition that even stars have diminished bargaining power is
two-pronged: the first is based on the concept of predicted box office value,
and the second is based on the high salaries stars command.6 9
Because stars generate speculative financing based on their predicted
box office success, 70 it might appear that they are able to negotiate more
65. LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 163.
66. Giordano, supra note 19, at 297.
67. Top Actress by Total Box Office Gross ofAll Movies, Movie Times, at http://www.themovie-times.com/thrsdir/actors.mv?actress+ByTG.html (last updated July 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Top Actress by Total Box Office].
68. Top Actress by Avg Box Office Gross of Movies in Role, Movie Times, at
http://www.the-movie-times.com/thrsdir/actors.mv?actress+ByAGS.html;
Top Actress by Avg
Box Gross of All Movies in the 90s, Movie Times, at http://www.the-movietimes.com/thrsdir/actors.mv?actress+ByTG.html.
69. See LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 13-14.
70. Setting
the
Pace,
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(Feb.
5,
2002),
at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/search/article-display.jsp?vnu-content-id
= 1429527.html [hereinafter Setting the Pace].

2003]

HOLLYWOOD HANDSHAKE DEALS

favorable employment terms, and therefore must have at least equal
bargaining power with the studios and producers. "Major studios are
usually more comfortable with important stars in their films as a way of
verifying decisions on the green lighting of production budgets.'
Perhaps that is why actors are routinely ranked according to their box
office value.7 2 In addition, to raise money to make a film, the producers
often engage film distributors to advance money to produce the film in
73
exchange for the exclusive right to distribute the finished movie.
"[H]istorically, attaching star power to a film is a key piece of the puzzle
for companies and individuals that finance pictures through presales. 7 4
According to David Dinerstein, Co-President of Paramount Classics, "[i]n
this day and age, when75 you.., are selling international rights, you have to
sell a star in the film."
There is reason to doubt, however, whether a star's box office value
guarantees the success of the film. Renowned director Sidney Lumet
disagrees with the view that a star's name on the marquee is a predictor of
the film's success:
I don't know what makes a hit. I don't think anyone does. It's
not the stars. My own movie Family Business starred Dustin
Hoffman, Sean Connery, and Matthew Broderick. It died. So
did Hoffman's and Warren Beatty's Ishtar. Kevin Costner and
Clint Eastwood in A Perfect World did no business, but
Eastwood alone chalked up major grosses with In the Line of
Fire. The inconsistencies of box office grosses in relation to
stars are endless.76
Producer Art Linson sides with Lumet on the issue: "While a movie is
in production, it seems more exciting to have a recognizable name. Once
the movie is completed, however, it only matters if it is good., 77 Thus, a
star's box office value may not be so predictable.
Nor is it clear that box office value levels out the bargaining power
disparity. Because a star's box office value can be unpredictable, and
because even stars have to compete for roles,78 one cannot assume that box
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
See, e.g., Top Actress by Total Box Office, supra note 67.
LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 15.
Setting the Pace,supra note 70.
Id.

76. SIDNEY LUMET, MAKING MOVIES 198-99 (1995).

77. LINSON, supra note 52, at 100.
78. See Weinstein, supra note 43.
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office value allows a star to dictate the terms of her employment. In
addition, presales are possible even without a big star. In Basinger, for
example, Main Line was still able to receive some foreign guarantees once
Basinger departed, albeit at a reduced amount. 79 Thus, a star's box office
value does not necessarily enable a star to negotiate better terms or equalize
the difference in bargaining power between the star and the studio.
It should also be noted that an artist's agent or manager arguably
makes up for some of this bargaining power differential, particularly for
well-known or influential agents and managers. Indeed, "[a]gents today
are among the most powerful people in the entertainment industry. They
handle every facet of their clients' careers and represent everyone from the
artists to their employers. Because of the experience and influence of
agents, entertainers trust their agents' judgment and often develop close
relationships with them." 80 However, once a relationship has been
established with a powerful agent, the artist still may have a lack of
bargaining power, because an agent's "underlying confidence comes from
knowing that if one of their clients dries up they can always get another
one." 8' Often "[t]he attitude of some agents is to grab as much as you can
when the client is hot, because who knows if you will be representing him
two years from now." 82 Furthermore, the best-known agents may represent
more than one famous actor who may end up competing for the same
starring role. 83 Thus, there is a serious question whether a top agent's
bargaining power necessarily transfers to his clients. What is clear,
however, is that the artist could use the extra bargaining power.
It must also be conceded that, in addition to the stars' box office
value, the high salaries stars command are evidence that they can negotiate
for more favorable terms of employment. "Because the studios compete so
heavily for the services of a small pool of stars and big-name directors, the
price of these commodities has risen dramatically. 8 4 However, stars make
up only a fraction of all union actors.8 5 Thus, even if we remove the stars
from the equation, the overall picture certainly seems to suggest, not
surprisingly, that the Hollywood market is bloated with artists seeking to

79. McLaughlin, supranote 3, at 123.
80. Stephen P. Clark, Main Line v. Basinger and the Mixed Motive Manager: Reexamining
the Agent's Privilegeto Induce Breach of Contract,46 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 628 (1995).
81. LINSON, supra note 52, at 35.
82. LITwAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 14.
83. Giordano, supra note 19, at 308.
84. LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 5.

85. See McNary, Bitter Pill,supra note 42.
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make their fortune.
C. The Critic
The bargaining power argument presented here is definitely not
For instance, Giordano attempts to refute the
without its critics.
proposition that artists have unequal bargaining power. 86 He starts with the
assertion that artists "simply lack the downside risk that studios cannot
avoid" and claims that this negates any bargaining power disparity. 87 But
while it is true that the movie business is risky, the studios have "devise[d]
complex schemes to reduce the financial risks of moviemaking," including
the use of presale finance agreements and outside investors. 88 Studios are
run by executives whose main motivation is avoiding risk, and they clearly
have the means of doing so at their disposal.89
Moreover, when viewed in light of the scarcity of acting jobs, the
argument that actors lack the downside risk becomes logically suspect. "In
the creative community, actors have the worst lot. It is often said that they
are always waiting to be invited to the party. They cannot perform their
craft unless a director casts them in a role. They have little control over
their careers." 90 Actors are therefore almost powerless in securing their
own employment. Both in the negotiation process and after a handshake
deal has been broken, it is difficult to see why the loss of a scarce job on
which an actor was relying would not present a downside risk.
Even assuming that Giordano's argument is true where the studio
decides to honor a handshake deal it has already made, it fails to consider
the effect of unequal bargaining power before any deal has been struck. He
seems to be grounded upon his assumption that if the studio decides not to
produce a picture, actors "get paid whether or not a project. . . is even
released." 91 When a production gets canceled, he says, "[s]tudios ...are in
the hole, as they have to finance everything that has taken place up to the
point at which a project is discontinued., 92 During the negotiating process,
however, studios are free to break off talks and move on to the multitude of
other actors with relatively no penalty. Because jobs are so scarce, an actor
86. See Giordano, supra note 19, at 300 (arguing that studios do not have a bargaining
power advantage).

87. Id.
88. LITwAK,DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 5.

89. See id. at 5-7 (discussing studio executives' risk aversion and their ways of it).
90. Id.at 191.
91. Giordano, supra note 19, at 300.

92. Id.
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negotiating for a job simply cannot do the same. 93 Moreover, as the cases
examined in Section II demonstrate, even when an oral agreement is
reached, the assumption that the studio will actually honor it is suspect.
Thus, the assertion that actors lack the downside risk is open to serious
question.
Still, Giordano argues that the huge financial risk assumed by the
studios is not offset by any similar risk taken by the artist, and therefore
"[r]equiring a studio to commit to a project is not analogous to requiring an
actor to do the same. ",94 He asserts that a studio should be able to cancel a
production since the "decision most likely reflects the studio's informed
opinion that it cannot make a profit by following through on its
intentions. 9 5 His inference is that, because the studios are taking the
financial risk, they should be allowed to break their agreements, since they
are doing so based on their assessment of that risk.
This financial risk argument has two problems, however, and each
must be looked at separately. First, there are certainly reasons unrelated to
profitability for why a studio might decide not to move forward on a
project. For example, when a team of executives in charge of production at
a studio changes, the new executives often "pull the plug" on any projects
that were initiated by their predecessors, starting fresh with their own
ideas.9 6 This would seem to cast doubt on Giordano's assertion that studios
only break their agreements based on financial considerations.
Furthermore, even if Giordano's financial risk proposition were
assumed to be true, would it really excuse the studios from honoring that
commitment? After all, isn't the purpose of contracts to allocate risk? If
studios can be excused from oral agreements because of their risk, as he
suggests, it would obviously render the value of the handshake agreement
worthless for the artist. A handshake deal literally would not be "worth the
paper it's written on.",97 Thus, while Giordano disagrees with the
bargaining power argument, his reasons simply do not support his
conclusion that the studios and producers should be excused from their oral
agreements.

93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra Part III.A (discussing the numerical disparity between artists and studios).
Giordano, supra note 19, at 300.
Id.
See generally LINSON, supra note 52 (citing as examples the "[h]eadlines ... FOX

CLEANS HouSE, GLICKSBURG AND MYER ARE OUT, Two Pics CANCELED").

97. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 102.
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IV. WRITTEN CONTRACTS: DON'T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB
Having identified Hollywood's reliance on handshake deals and the
disparity of bargaining power associated with them, it becomes important
to highlight the advantages that a regime of written agreements might bring
to the equation. In order to demonstrate the benefits of moving to a system
of written contracts in the movie industry, it is necessary to identify the
functions fulfilled by formal, written contracts. Formal contracts fulfill
four important, interrelated functions: evidentiary, cautionary, channeling,
98
and signaling.
A. Clue
The "evidentiary" function is the one commonly thought of in
reference to a written contract; it is "evidence of the existence and purport
of the contract, in case of controversy." 99 Simply put, written contracts
prove the existence of an agreement where no such proof might otherwise
be available. This function can be particularly useful in Hollywood,
because "when a dispute over.., a handshake deal erupts, and the only
written evidence, if any, consists of a few ambiguous letters or short-form
'deal memos,' it may be difficult to prove who is correct."' 00 Obviously,
where there is a final, written, signed contract, there is seldom a
controversy over whether a contract exists.1° 1
For this reason,
entertainment attorneys know that "it is usually advantageous to
have an
10 2
agreement in writing, if only for the sake of creating evidence.
Such evidence is often invaluable in an industry that is "extremely
volatile, risky, and beset with problems."10 3
Furthermore, in an
environment where anyone can call himself a producer, people routinely
use "smoke and mirrors and gossip and innuendo... to generate the
illusion that they have something desirable."' 1 4 For these reasons, parties
are hesitant to commit until they are sure a project is really going to
happen.10 5 Written contracts are thus helpful because they relieve the

98. See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS INCONTRACT LAW 110-11 (4th ed. 1999)
(quoting Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Forn, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-04 (1941)).
99. McLaughlin, supranote 3, at 105 (internal citations omitted).
100. Spillane, supranote 6, at 15.
101. See id at 16.
102. LITWAK, DEALMAK1NG, supra note 34, at 17.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id. at 254.
105. See id. at 13.
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parties from worry about whether a deal is real or not. Moreover, even
when everyone's intentions are legitimate, there are "many reasons why,
despite [the filmmakers'] great efforts and talent, [they] may not succeed in
getting the [film] produced."' 0 6 For example, an actor around whom the
project is based might pull out because the producers fail to "secure
financing, or obtain the right co-star, or attract a studio-acceptable
director."' 1 7 Written agreements can provide evidence of whether everyone
is indeed committed or not.
The evidentiary function of written contracts also serves to avoid
undue confusion or surprise by clarifying or specifying contractual terms,
particularly where what is agreed to in the beginning changes drastically
over the course of the production. For example, the script is generally
always in flux and "often changed, even ruined, by those with more
clout.' 1 8 "When a director or star comes aboard, they often want to
change the script.' 1 9 Furthermore, even after everyone has agreed upon a
final script, the film may change due to the editing process. What is
eventually seen by the public depends upon factors such as the angle of the
shot and the lighting, the focus and the zoom, and most of all the editing. 110
Producer Sidney Lumet notes that the "editor, the director, and the
cameraman... [are] the only ones who know everything that was shot in
the first place.""' And, as Lumet learned in the days before he could
demand full creative control over his movies, "[o]nce the studio puts ' its
12
hands on a picture, there's no way of knowing what will finally emerge." "
These changes can sometimes materially alter the terms of an artist's
employment, regardless of the intent of the parties.' 3 Nudity on film
serves as perhaps the best example. When performing a nude scene, an
actress may not even know exactly what nudity will "emerge ' 14 until she
actually sees the completed film. As an example, Sharon Stone claimed
she did not realize the director of Basic Instinct was filming the infamous,
fully-lit, frontal view of her naked crotch until she saw the finished film at

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 162.

109. Id.
110. See LUMET, supra note 76, at 155.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 153.
113. See generally id.at 153 (explaining that a "two minute" portion of film may wind up
unrecognizable).
114. See id.
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the premiere. 115 Although the director of the film disputed her claim,11 6
Stone's reaction to the scene reinforces the notion that nudity is perhaps the
most material aspect of an actor's agreement to perform. "Actors are very7
different about love and sex scenes. Some shy away from them.""1
Indeed, in the Basinger case, Kim Basinger "refused to participate in the
project solely because she "was concerned about the amount of
unnecessary and gratuitous nudity in the picture."11 8 Thus, it is clear that
nudity can be a material factor of an actor's employment.
Because nudity is so often material to the terms of employment, SAG
has adopted several requirements so that these terms will be welldefined." 9 For instance, SAG requires that actors be notified in advance of
their interview for employment if any nudity or sex acts are expected in the
role, and gives the performer the right to have a person of his or her choice
present during the audition. 12 More importantly, SAG has adopted several
written contract requirements for nudity on film in order to further protect
its members from surprises, such as the rule that a performer must give
written consent prior to appearing in a nude scene.1 21 "Such consent must
include a general description as to the extent of the nudity and the type of
physical contact required in the scene.' 2 2 In addition, no nude still
23
photography may be taken without the performer's written consent.
Given that application of the SAG rules would appear to have invalidated
any handshake deal that existed in Basinger, at least with respect to the
nudity content, it is unclear why Basinger did not make that argument.
However, the rules highlight the special nature of nudity on film, and they
demonstrate how written agreements protect actors from the constant and
often material changes that take place in Hollywood.

115. See Paul Morley, Aiming Thigh High, SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993; see also Basic
Instinct, Barnes and Noble.Com, Reviews, at http://video.barnesandnoble.com/search/
product.aspwrk=3619588.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
116. See Jim Slotek, Instinct for Controversy: Hollow Man Director Paul Verhoeven
Upfront
About
Nudity,
TORONTO
SUN,
Aug.
2,
2000,
available
at
http://www.canoe.ca/JamMoviesArtistsV/verhoeven_paul.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
117. LUMET, supra note 76, at 65.
118. Giordano, supra note 19, at 293.
119. Screen Actors Guild Codified Basic Agreement of 1995 for Independent Producers
§ 43.
120. Id. § 43.A.
121. Id. § 43.D.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 43.C.
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B. One FalseMove
The "cautionary" function refers to the fact that signing a written
document acts as a "check against inconsiderate action."1 24 It serves as a
deterrent to those who have not considered the consequences of making the
agreement,125 something that might certainly be of help in the film
business. By way of example, Kim Basinger withdrew from Boxing
Helena because, after "lengthy negotiations and alleged oral agreements,"
126
she finally decided there was too much gratuitous nudity in the film.
Had she been required to sign a written contract spelling out the terms of
her employment, it would likely have caused her to consider those terms
more thoroughly, and she might have made the decision to withdraw before
the studio deemed her to be committed to the project. This "cautionary"
aspect of written contracts would likely prevent many such disputes in the
film business.
Next, there is the "channeling" function of written contracts.1 27 The
use of a written contract "furnishes a simple and external test of
enforceability."' 2 8 Basically, a written contract makes it much easier for
the judge to determine whether the agreement is enforceable or not, and is
29
likely to save judicial resources and costs in the event of a controversy.'
A look at the cases presented in Section II makes it clear that such disputes
do arise in Hollywood. If enforceability of a performance contract were
predicated upon the existence of a written memorandum, then judicial
enforcement would be made simple: no memo, no contract. Thus, both the
cautionary and the channeling functions provide benefits to the film
business that handshake deals do not.
C. Signs
130
Finally, there is the "signaling" function of written contracts.
Simply put, a written memorandum helps to "signal" to all parties that the
negotiations are over and the final terms have been reached.' 3' In the

124. KNAPP, supranote 98, at 110.
125. See id.
126. Ainbender, supra note 24; see also Giordano, supra note 19, at 293.
127. See KNAPP, supra note 98, at 110.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See generally id. at 111 (explaining the necessity of "some external mark which will
signalize the testament and distinguish it from non-testamentary expressions of intention").
131. See id.
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planning stages of a motion picture, the requirements for each participant
are often in flux as the parties engage in creative development. 32 This is
very important, since the law is well-established that "[w]here a person
offers to do a definite thing and another introduces a new term into the
acceptance, his answer is a mere expression of willingness to treat [sic] or
it is a counter proposal, and in neither case is there a contract."' 33 An
agreement therefore "cannot be mutual unless all parties agree upon the
same thing in the same sense."' 134 In applying this logic to performance
contracts, it follows that the introduction of new terms and requirements for
the artist's employment would necessarily preclude the formation of a
contract until the artist agreed to them. Because the script and cast are
often constantly changing in the early stages of a production, 35 the
signaling function of written agreements is therefore a crucial indicator that
the parties have agreed on the terms and are actually bound.
This is particularly important given that in the early stages of the
production the parties are likely to engage in "precontractual reliance.' 3 6
An explanation of this term is helpful:
Before a contract is made, there is generally a period
(sometimes a long one) in which the parties negotiate the
contract's terms. During this period, the parties might make
reliance expenditures-investments that will raise the value of
performance if the contract is formed but will have a lesser
value otherwise. For example, in negotiating an employment
contract .. the employer
may prepare tasks and facilities for the
37
potential employee. 1
The disparity in the possible results of such actions (i.e. either higher
or lower value of the investment depending on whether a contract is formed
or not) creates a financial risk inherent in precontractual reliance. 138 The
risk is that, after making expenditures in reliance upon the future
agreement, the "other party may walk away from negotiations without
having incurred any cost," leaving the party that made the expenditures at a

132. See LINSON, supra note 52, at 91-92.
133. Apablasa v. Merritt & Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (Ct. App. 1959).
134. Id.
135. See L1NSON, supra note 52, at 91-92.
136. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, PrecontractualReliance, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 423, 424 (June 2001).
137. Id.at 423.
138. See id.
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loss.139
In the film business, parties often make decisions based on
precontractual reliance.
For instance, the artist may engage in
precontractual reliance by "tum[ing] down competing offers," putting the
14
actor at risk of remaining unemployed in a market where jobs are scarce. 0
In addition, producers often use precontractual reliance in obtaining
financing for a film by indicating a star's interest in the project. 41 A
problem can arise, however, if producers confuse a star's "interest" in the
project with her "commitment" to the project. Without a written contract,
the producer and actor may differ over the extent to which they feel
bound.1 42 Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger143 once again provides an
excellent example of this problem and how the signaling function of a
written memo requirement would have been invaluable. Had either the
producers or distributors insisted on getting Basinger's agreement to
perform in writing, it would have been clear to all parties that Basinger was
committed, and the film could have been financed by the original presales
amount. This is why experts advise that a "film investor should never
accept oral assurances from a producer or distributor," but should demand
written assurances instead. 44 Requiring the artist and the studio to commit
in writing eliminates the possibility that the parties will later differ on
whether an agreement was actually in place.
V. THE USUAL SUSPECTS: ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING HANDSHAKE
DEALS ARE WEAK

The reasons most often given for justifying Hollywood's reliance on
handshake deals merge into two key uniqueness arguments: 1) the business
is unique due to its speed and complexity; and 2) there is a unique honor
1 45
code in Hollywood that binds the various parties to their oral agreements.
To see why these arguments are both suspect, it is important to examine

139. Id. at 432.
140. See id at 423.
141. See
Setting
the
Pace, HOLLYWOOD
REP.
(Feb.
5,
2002)
at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/search/article display.jsp?vnu content-id
=1429527.html.
142. See supra Part II (discussing Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994
WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994)).
143. No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994).
144. Mark Litwak, Minimizing the Risk for Motion Picture Investors, 24 L.A. LAWYER 18,
22 (Apr. 2001).
145. McLaughlin, supranote 3, at 103; see infra Parts V.A-B.
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each separately.
A. The Fastand the Furious
First, it is argued that the business is somehow unique because it
involves too many players and moves too fast to require written
46
contracts. 1
The practice of relying on oral agreements seems to have
developed because filmmaking is a unique creative venture that
requires participation from so many disparate players:
producers,
directors,
actors,
writers,
financiers,
cinematographers, editors, wardrobe personnel, and production
designers. The widespread belief is that stopping to haggle and
document the details of every relationship will cause a project to
147
lose steam.
Indeed, many feel that if written documents were required in
148
Hollywood, then "nothing would get done in this town."'
Surely there is no doubt that the moviemaking business is
sophisticated, complicated, and full of expensive transactions. As for
equipment, "[e]ven a small, low-budget picture... need[s]... one grip
truck, one electric truck, one prop truck, one generator truck, one make up
and hair truck, and two campers"' 149 "Because of overhead and union
contracts, the costs for major studios far exceed those for small
independent companies .... The average studio cost for each film, without
5
including charges for prints and advertisements, exceeds $20 million.' 0
Litwak places the price tag even higher for the typical studio film, at "about
$50 million to produce and another $31 million to market."''
These costs
include the "hiring of crews, the building of sets, the expenses for
locations, the renting of sound stages, the manufacturing of wardrobe, the
casting of actors" and so on. 152 One gets the idea.
Given these huge budgets, the potential profits, and the enormous
amount of labor and resources involved in making a film, Hollywood
should adopt the view of written contracts that other professions hold:

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 103.
Giordano, supra note 19, at 297.
Id.
LUMET, supra note 76, at 133.
LINSON, supra note 52, at 94.

151. LiTWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 2.

152. LINSON, supra note 52, at 115.
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Business people in any industry can take certain simple
precautions in their dealings to spell out in writing the
circumstances under which the parties will or will not have an
agreement and whether it will be written or oral. Most persons
outside the entertainment industry (and those to whom they
report) would be aghast to commit services, goods, or
substantial sums of money
to a transaction without taking such
1 53
minimal precautions.
Because handshake deals are often considered "naive and neglectful,"
many outside Hollywood are often shocked to learn that such a
"sophisticated and complicated business would so widely rely on them for
54
large transactions.0
Not only is the business complex, but "[d]ealmaking has become
more complex as well."' 55 Initiating a motion picture production often
consumes countless hours of negotiation between directors, producers,
actors, and those financing the film. 156 Director Billy Wilder lamented late
in his career that he spent "80% of the time making deals, and 20% making
pictures."'157 Because of the dauntingly large endeavor of producing films,
it is unsound business practice for the parties involved not to reduce to a
written contract the countless hours spent in the negotiation process.
Furthermore, though the film business undoubtedly involves many
players, this does not mean the movie business moves "too fast" to use
written agreements. In Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger,158 for
example, the actress first read the Boxing Helena script and indicated her
interest in January of 1991.159 Basinger's agent confirmed the star's
intention to appear in the film in late February. 60 In fact, it was not until
June 10 that the star expressly reneged on her oral agreement to star in the
movie. 6 Why this period of more than five months was not enough time
to have a written contract executed for Basinger's performance is not clear,
since the actress apparently had enough time to execute a contract with a

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Spillane, supra note 6, at 16.
See McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 103.
LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 11.
See id.
Id. (quoting the late director Billy Wilder).
No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994).
See Giordano, supra note 19, at 288.
Id.
See id. at 289.
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162
new talent agency during the same period.

B. A Few Good Men
The other key argument for Hollywood's reliance on oral contracts is
that the practice is safeguarded by a unique "honor code" that has been
built up in the movie business:
The top Hollywood dealmakers are sometimes referred to as
"players."
These agents, attorneys, studio executives and
producers regularly conduct business with one another and
observe an unwritten code of behavior. While players are
admired for being tough and shrewd, dishonesty is not
respected.
For an industry with a reputation for chicanery, outsiders may
be surprised to find that many players take great pride in
keeping their word. They make oral agreements with one
163
another that are relied upon ....
The thrust of this argument is that this trust-based honor system ruins
the reputation of parties who break them, eliminating the need for written
contracts. 164 "Just as one could destroy another's career by taking her to
court for breaching a contract, one could destroy another's professional
165
reputation by spreading word that he is unreliable and dishonest.,
The suggestion that this honor code extends to studios, however,
seems to defy logic, given the disparity in bargaining power between artists
and employers. In an environment where there are roughly 90,000 union
actors competing for the chance to secure paid employment, 166 and only
about eleven studios willing to provide jobs, 167 can anyone seriously argue
that studios who break their oral contracts will somehow find themselves
unable to find actors to hire? Unfortunately, Giordano gives no practical
evidence to support his contention that this honor system works to "compel
168
[studios] to act more virtuous" toward artists.

162. See generally id.at 288 (describing how Basinger was able to change agents in less
than two months during the same time period).
163. LrIWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 251.
164. See Giordano, supra note 19, at 298.
165. Id.
166. McNary, Bitter Pill,supra note 42.
167. See
CinemaScreen,
Distributors
and
Production
Companies,
at
http://www.cinemascreen.co.uk/directory/default.asp?c=6.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
168. See Giordano, supra note 19, at 298.
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Other evidence, however, indicates that, rather than acting virtuous,
these dealmakers have developed tactics and strategies that can be
downright nasty, particularly for the "uninitiated." 169 Incredibly, they
routinely use tactics such as hype, exaggeration, stressing the positive,
ignoring the negative, high-balling, low-balling, creating confusion,
uncomfortable silence, outright intimidation, irrational behavior, and even
feigning insanity. 170 Bizarre as they may sound, these171"shenanigans" are
apparently acceptable under the Hollywood honor code.
Furthermore, whether this code gives studios an incentive to honor
their handshake deals with artists is open to question.
If the studio backs out [before the talent has been hired], no real
harm is done. It will be quickly forgotten by everyone but the
writer.
Once the studio obligates to a star or
director... [however,] it is too late to turn back. Suddenly,
from nothing, tens of millions of dollars
are at stake, and if that
72
money is lost, it will be remembered.
Thus, contrary to suggestions of an honor code binding them to their
oral agreements, studios would seem to have an incentive to remain
uncommitted for as long as possible.
C. Judge Dread
Interestingly enough, a federal court has already rejected the
argument that moviemakers are unique and should therefore be exempt
from written contract requirements. 173 In addition, several other judges and
a jury have shown their distaste for handshake deals. By looking at each of
these developments in turn, a judicial disfavor for Hollywood's use of oral
contracts becomes apparent.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has already rejected the argument
that the film business is somehow too unique to use written contracts. 174 In
Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen,175 movie producer Larry Cohen argued
that he should be exempt from a federal statute requiring transfers of

169. See LITWAK, DEALMAKING, supra note 34, at 251.
170. See id. at 251-53 (discussing the different tactics and strategies used for negotiations in
the film business).
171. Id. at 251.
172. LINSON, supra note 52, at 92.
173. Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-57 (9th. Cir. 1990).
174. Id.
175. 908 F.2d 555 (9th. Cir. 1990).
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copyright to be in writing.'7 6 Cohen had commissioned some film footage
to be produced by a special effects company for his low-budget horror
movie entitled The Stuff' 7 7 When he saw the footage, Cohen claimed he
was completely dissatisfied and refused to pay the full price, even though
he included the footage in his finished film. 178 As a result, the special

effects company sued Cohen, claiming that his use of the footage was a
copyright infringement since there was no written transfer of copyright as
required by federal law. 179 In his defense, Cohen argued that it was
customary in Hollywood to rely on handshake deals rather than written
contracts, stating that "moviemakers are too absorbed in developing 'joint
creative endeavors' to 'focus upon the legal niceties of copyright
licenses." 8 °
In an opinion that could almost be described as Intro to Written
Agreements, Judge Kozinski seemed to scold the movie industry for its
reliance on handshake deals.18 ' First, the judge stated that "[c]ommon
sense tells us that agreements should routinely be put in writing."' 18 2 He
continued, stating:
This simple practice prevents misunderstandings by spelling out
the terms of a deal in black and white, forces parties to clarify
their thinking and consider problems that could potentially arise,
and encourages them to take their promises seriously because
it's harder to backtrack on a written contract than on an oral
one. 183
In rejecting the argument that moviemakers are "too involved" to use
written contracts, Judge Kozinski stated that the "writing requirement is not
unduly burdensome; it necessitates neither protracted negotiations nor
substantial expense. The rule is really quite simple: If the copyright holder
agrees to transfer ownership to another party, that party must get the
I8 4
copyright holder to sign a piece of paper saying so."'
Judge Kozinski then added some of his trademark humor in indicating

176. See id. at 556; see also 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2001) (requiring that all transfers of copyright
must be made in writing).
177. Cohen, 908 F.2d at 555-56.
178. Id. at 556.
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 204; see also id. § 106A(e)(l).
180. Cohen, 908 F.2d at 556-57.
181. Id. at 557.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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his distaste for Hollywood's attitude towards the written contract. "It
doesn't have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma statement will
do." 185 After citing several other cases, the Cohen court concluded that
"[t]he Supreme Court and this circuit, while recognizing the custom and
practice in the industry, have refused to permit moviemakers to
sidestep... [the] writing requirement." 186 Thus, Cohen was a flat rejection
of the argument that Hollywood's uniqueness should somehow exempt
filmmakers from using18 7written contracts. The Supreme Court denied
review of this decision.

In addition, there is reason to believe that other courts and judges
view moviemakers' reliance on the oral contract with dismay.
In 1988, Warner [Brothers] sued comedian Rodney Dangerfield
because of his alleged breach of an oral contract to appear in the
motion picture Caddyshack II. When the matter first came to
court, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge John Zebrowski
delivered a blistering rebuke to Warner Bros.' attorneys [for
their failure to produce written contracts].
Judge Zebrowski has since been elevated to California's
Second District Court of Appeal, and he may well be one of the
justices who hears any Warner appeal from the Coppola verdict.
Judge Madeleine I. Flier, the trial judge in Coppola, is clearly
among the judges who share Justice Zebrowski's point of view.
Before submitting Coppola's tort claims to the jury, Judge Flier
granted the director's motion for summary judgment ruling as a
matter of law that there was no contract between Warner Bros.
and Coppola.
Why not?
Because
a draft "long-form"
88
agreement had never been signed. 1
Given the judicial reluctance to accept the informalities of handshake
deals, some have argued that Hollywood desperately needs to change its
ways. It has been suggested that the "view about the importance of having
a signed contract should be duly noted by transactional attorneys in the
motion picture industry, because that opinion is widely held by the
California judiciary."'89 Similarly, "the [Coppola] jury awarded the

185. Cohen, 908 F.2d at 557.
186. Id. at 558.
187. Danforth v. Cohen, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
188. Joseph D. Schleimer, Coppola Verdict's Impact on Studio/Talent Talks, 14 ENT. L. &
FIN. Sept. 1998, at 1.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
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punitive damages because the message . .. [they wanted] to send is that
Hollywood has to revise the way it does business. It seems that at least
some judges and jurors feel oral contracts are unsatisfactory tools for doing
business, even in the entertainment industry."1' 90 These comments identify
a trend among
judges and juries to treat Hollywood handshake deals with
"contempt." 191 It logically follows that the more skeptical judges and juries
are about enforcing oral agreements, the more risk the industry parties will
assume in relying on them.
VI. WE DON'T NEED NO STINKIN' BADGES: THE CASE FOR LEGISLATION
Rather than allow judges to slowly carve the oral contract out of the
motion picture industry through the use of the judiciary, the California
legislature (and those of other film industry states, such as New York)
should do so by statute. California already protects parties from being
bound to unconscionable contracts, and it allows tailoring of this protection
to particular industries. 92 Furthermore, California has already singled out
certain types of performance artist contracts for special treatment, including
those for actors and directors.193 A look at the existing law will give a
framework for changes that could be easily made to end Hollywood's
reliance on oral contracts.
A. The Sting
To begin with, California law protects parties who have been
ensnared by unconscionable contracts. 94 By enacting California Civil
Code section 1670.5, the California legislature has given courts the power
to declare a contract or any provision within it unconscionable as a matter
of law. 195 In interpreting section 1670.5, courts have repeatedly found
contracts to be unconscionable where there is, among other factors, an
inequality of bargaining power resulting in a lack of meaningful
190. McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 110-11 (internal quotes omitted).
191. Id.at 110.

192. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985). "The basis test is, whether, in the light of
the general background and the needs of the particular case, the clauses involved are so one-sided
as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract." Id. cmt. 1.
193. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 526(b)(5) (West 1979 & Supp. 2003) (allowing
injunction in contracts where promised service is of a unique or intellectual character that gives it
particular value); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
194. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a).
195. Id.
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negotiation. 196 Thus, in California, both the legislature and the courts have
moved to alleviate disparity in the bargaining power between contracting
parties.
Not only does existing law allow for protection against unequal
bargaining power, but there is also precedent for singling out particular
industries for protection. In making its determination under section 1670.5,
a court may consider the "commercial setting" of the challenged
contract. 197 This language reflects "legislative recognition that a claim of
unconscionability often cannot be determined merely by examining the
face of the contract, but will require inquiry into its setting, purpose, and
effect."'1 98 Tailoring any new law to the needs of the motion picture
business would certainly be to consider the "commercial setting" as
allowed by California law.1 99
More pointedly, there is precedent in California for granting movie
artists special treatment by requiring their contracts to be in writing. 200 For
instance, there are two California laws that prohibit the granting of an
injunction to enforce personal service contracts unless the contracts were
made in writing. 2°1 The laws both apply to the "rendition of personal
services from one to another where the promised service is of a special,
unique, unusual, extraordinary, or intellectual character, which gives it
peculiar value." 20 2 In other words, where a dispute arises over an unwritten
agreement for personal services in California, a party can sue for damages,
but cannot seek the equitable relief of an injunction.2 3
Caselaw makes it clear that the language of these laws applies to
acting and similar activities. In ParamountPictures Corp. v. Holden,204 the
studio sued actor William Holden, claiming he had defaulted on an oral
agreement to appear in motion pictures. 20 5 Holden denied that he had
entered into the oral contract.20 6 The court declined to decide upon the
196. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982).
197. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(b).
198. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 148 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Perdue v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985)).
199. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(b).
200. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(b)(5); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(e) (West
1997).
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. 166 F. Supp 684, 686 (C.D. Cal. 1958),
205. Id.
206. Id.
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existence of the handshake deal, 20 7 and -refused to issue an injunction
preventing Holden from performing for a third party.20 8 In interpreting one
of the two aforementioned laws requiring written agreements, the Holden
court held that "even those courts which enforce contracts for personal
20 9
services will not compel acting or activities of similar character.,
Clearly then, California law already singles out actors and similar artists by
requiring their service contracts to be in writing. Therefore, if lawmakers
are persuaded that artists have a lack of bargaining power with respect to
the studios, 210 ample precedent no doubt exists for using the law to
specifically alleviate this disparity.
B. A Civil Action
Having determined that there is precedent for legislation requiring
written agreements, what remains is to look at real means of doing so. One
way to accomplish this goal would be for California to add such personal
service contracts to the list of agreements falling within California Civil
Code section 1624,21 otherwise known as the Statute of Frauds. The law
prevents parties from making false assertions about oral contracts. 212 It
does so by declaring certain types of contracts unenforceable unless
evidenced by a signed, written contract.2 13 The "[p]urpose of the statute of
frauds is to prevent fraud and pejury with respect to certain agreements by
requiring ...more reliable evidence of some writing signed by the party to
be charged., 214 The reasoning for the statute's application is that "[a]s a
matter of policy, the understanding of the parties should be definite and
2 15
clear, and should not be left to mere conjecture.
There is indeed precedent for singling out particular industries within
the Statute of Frauds. California's current statute, like most others,
specifically includes contracts for real estate.21 6 The policy reason behind
207.
made in a
208.
209.
210.
studios).
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 687 (stating that a determination of whether a contract existed should not be
preliminary proceeding).
Id. at 694.
Id.at 691 (emphasis added).
See supra Section III(discussing the bargaining power disparity between artists and
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
See Realty Corp. of Am. v. Burton, 327 P.2d 948, 957 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624.
Sousa v. First Cal. Co., 225 P.2d 955, 961 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).

215. Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Cal. 1995)
(citations omitted).
216. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624.
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application in this particular industry is that it requires specific protection
against "[v]agueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty. '2 17
Similarly, the motion picture industry is quite susceptible to these same
problems. 2 18 The legislature could thus add to California Civil Code
Section 1624 new language bringing motion picture personal service
contracts within the statute that would be in line with California's existing
law. Such a change might at first seem radical, but as discussed above, it
would be a simple solution that would solve the problems arising from the
handshake deal in Hollywood.
Not only should the California legislature work to alleviate the
informalities of Hollywood contract deals, but the Screen Actors Guild
should take steps to alleviate the problems that arise when using oral
agreements, similar to what it has done with respect to nudity. 21 9 To do so,
it could require its members to have signed, written contracts in order to
bring a claim of action against a producer or studio. Such a requirement
would still allow performers to be employed without a written contract, but
they would do so at their own risk, and would not be protected should a
dispute over the existence or terms of the agreement arise.
Since this would still leave its members expose to risk, however, SAG
could in the alternative require all of its performers' contracts to be in
writing unless there were extenuating circumstances. This would allow for
exceptions where a written contract truly was not possible due to time
constraints or other logistical problems. Finally, the Guild could amend its
rules to require all SAG-franchised agents to obtain written, executed deal
memos prior to indicating assent on behalf of their clients. Each of these
steps would likely go a long way toward ending Hollywood's addiction to
the use of handshake deals, at least with respect to artists.
Vii. THAT'S A WRAP!
Although they may be firmly entrenched in the business of making
movies, oral agreements can be problematic to all of the parties involved.
The disparity in numbers between actors and those who hire them creates
an environment that allows studios to view artists as "replaceable." The
studios then use this disparity to impose handshake deals upon artists who
have few or no other sources of employment. These handshake deals favor
the studio over the artists who, due to a lack of alternatives, have no power
217. Rivers v. Beadle, 7 Cal. Rptr. 170, 172 (Ct. App. 1960).
218. See supra Part IV (discussing the motion picture industry's volatile, changing nature).
219. See supra Part IV (discussing SAG's requirements for roles involving nudity).
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to demand a written agreement. In addition, handshake deals place a
particular burden on the frustrated courts that are forced to sort them out
later. Thus, Hollywood presents a classic case in which employers use
unequal bargaining power to impose an unfavorable term, the use of a
handshake deal, upon employees who have no choice but to accept it.
For these reasons, industry lawyers should adopt a practice of
requiring signed, written contracts between artists and producers. To
further this end, the Screen Actors Guild should adopt a rule that all
performer contracts must be made in a written memorandum. Most
importantly, the California legislature should work to make handshake
deals a thing of the past by placing them within the existing Statute of
Frauds. Until these changes are made, the wave of resentment over
handshake deals is only likely to grow. Perhaps the world outside
Hollywood will soon join in with the voice of Judge John Zebrowski, who
so famously rebuked the movie industry lawyers from his bench. 220 As
Judge Zebrowski exclaimed at the Hollywood attorneys: "Aren't you
people ever going to come in front of me with a signed contract?! !,,221
Rick Smith*

220. Schleimer, supra note 188.
221. Id. (emphasis added).

*This Comment is dedicated to the good Lord, my Mom, my Dad, my brother
Tad, my cousin Chris, the Eastsiders, Jessica, and everyone at Rehash Records
LLC. You know who you are. Special thanks to Professor Sean M. Scott for her
unbounded knowledge of contracts at 8:00 a.m. (not 8:01) in the morning! This
Comment also goes out to those who face stumbling blocks in pursuit of their
dreams, but who persevere and remain faithful until the end.

